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and child support, it follows that the
make such
terminated with the death
of the former husband insofar as such payments are alimony
Court (1937), H Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d
I'arker
, 193 Cal. 478, 481 [225 P .
.Hamilton (1949), 94 Cal.App.2d 293,
298
; Bobet·ts v.
, 122 Cal.App.
) , although the obligation survives
insofar as the payments are child
(1949), 84 Cal.2d 552, 556 [212
. Burwen
, 216 Cal. 608, 612 [15

\rith the

reverse the judgment with directions consistent
views.

J ., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
12, 1956. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 24036.

In Bank.

Nov. 20, 1956.]

Estate of ISABELLA N. SKINKER, Deceased. NANCY
SKINKER WEDDI.JE, as Executrix et al., Appellants,
v. ROBER'r C. KIRKWOOD, as State Controller, Respondent.
[la, lb] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-The commissions of an executrix and her attorney allowed as deductions for inheritance tax purposes should be the amount of
statutory commissions in effect at the time of decedent's death,
and not the increased fees as allowed by Prob. Code, § 901,
as amended and effective at a later date.
Deduction of commissions of executors, administrators or
trustees in
succession or estate tax, note, 92 A.L.R. 537.
See also Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 423; Am.Jur., Inheritance, Estate and
Gift Taxes, § 249 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-6] Taxation,§ 441(3); [3] TaxaTaxation, §436; [8, 9] Taxation, §437; [10]
tion, §441(4);
Statutes, § 161; [11] Decedents' Estates, §§ 219, 225; [12] Decedents' Estates, § 219.
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!d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-Deductions allowable
for inheritance tax purposes are not
those
the estate.
[3] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions-Federal Estate Tax.
-Under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13989, the federal estate tax deduction is not
the actual tax
it
either that
calculaamount or a smaller amount based on
tions.
[ 4] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-Comrnissions allowed
for inheritance tax
may not be the commissions
in the probate
; the intent of the
enacting Rev.
Code, § 13988,
the commissions allowed executors or
"computed on the value of the decedent's estate as of the date of
decedent's death," was not to allow as deductions the actual
burden sustained by an estate, but a close approximation
thereof, based on standards set up in the inheritance tax
law.
[5] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-Under Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 13988, allowing as a deduction only "ordinary expenses of administration," extraordinary expenses of administration, although borne by the estate, are not a deduction for
inheritance tax purposes.
[6] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-Application of "new
rates," in effect after the date of decedent's death, to deductions for inheritance taxes allowable under Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13988, would be unconstitutional as constituting a gift of
public monies, and such construction should be avoided.
[7] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-Inheritance taxes are
fixed and determined in accordance with the law in effect at
the date of death.
[8] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Vesting of Right to Tax-Subsequent Legislation.-With respect to inheritance tax, the
Legislature cannot by a subsequent act increase or decrease
the rate, remit the tax, or in any way surrender, impair or
limit rights that have become fixed.
[9] !d.-Inheritance Taxation-Vesting of Right to Tax-Subsequent Legislation.-vVhere an inheritance tax has become
due, a subsequent act of the Legislature
the tax
reason of change in exemptions, tax rates or in any way
a gift of state monies and is prohibited by Const., art. IV,
§ 31, and retroactive application of such legislation is therefore prohibited.
[10] Statutes-Construction-Sustaining Constitutionality.-When
two alternative interpretations of a statute are presented, one
of which would be unconstitutional and the other constitu-
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the
the court will choose the one that will
of the statute.
Decedents' Estates- Executors- Compensation. --Whether
extra fees or commissions should be allowed an executor in
a given case, and if so how
is committed to the discretion of the
whereas in the case of
sions and fees
determination is made
the court's function
limited to ministerial
Id.-Executors-Compensation.-Statutory fees and commisare in the nature
sions allowed an executrix and her
of fixed
and the interest thus
from the standpoint of heirs, devisees, personal
and attorney,
are substantive in character and not procedural.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San
Diego County fixing an inheritance tax. h N. Turrentine,
Judge. Affirmed.

R. 1\L Switzler for Appellants.
James "\V. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, "\Valter
H. Miller, Chief Assistant Inheritance Tax Attorney, and
Vincent .J. McMahon, Assistant Inheritance Tax Attorney,
for Respondent.
McCOMB, J.-This is an appeal by Nancy Skinker Weddle,
executrix of the last will and testament of Isabella N. Skinker,
and R. JYI. Switzler, attorney for said executrix, from an order
overruling objections to the report of the inheritance tax
appraiser and fixing an inheritance tax due by reason of the
death of Isabella N. Skinker.
CHRONOLOGY

i. Isabella N. Skinker died July 19, 1955.
ii. Decedent's will was probated August 5, 1955, and Nancy
Skinker \Veddle appointed as executrix.
iii. At the time of decedent's death section 901 of the
Probate Code read in part as follows:
"The executor, when no compensation is provided by the
will or he renounces all claim thereto, or the administrator,
shall receive commissions upon the amount of estate accounted for by him, as follows: For the first thousand dollars,
at the rate of seven per cent; for the next nine thousand dollars at the rate of four per cent; for the next ten thousand
dollars, at the rate of three per cent; for the next thirty

all above
"1

lV.

effective
follows:
New Rates•

1,000
9,000
Next
3
10,000
Next
2
3
30,000
Next
2
100,000
1
Next
11;2
350,000
1
Next
1
500,000
1
Over
v. The inheritance tax appraiser filed his inheritance tax
report and allowed as deductions executor's and attorney's
commissions based on the "old rates" which were in effect
on the date of decedent's death.
vi. Pursuant to section 14509 of the Hevenue and Taxation
Code, objections were filed to the report by the executrix
and her attorney, appellants.
Appellants contended that the deduction allowable for
inheritance tax purposes should be computed on the new
and higher rates as set forth in section 901 of the Probate
Code effective September 7, 1955.
rrhe objections were overruled, and an order was made
approving the inheritance tax report as filed and fixing the
inheritance tax on the basis of the "old rates."
The estate is not in condition for closing.
QUESTION

[la]

In fixing the inheritance tax due by reason of the
death of
should there be permitted as a deduction
the stahttory commissions allowed the executr·ix and her atas set forth in section 901 of the Probate Code in
at the t1:rne of decedent's death on July 19, 1955, or
the increased
as allowed by section 901 of the sarne code
amended and effective September 7, 1955?
\Ve are of the opinion that the commissions of the executrix
and her attorney, allowed as deductions for inheritance tax
1
Hereinafter tho rates in effect pursuant to section 901 of the
Probate Code at the time of decedent's death on July 19, 1955, will
be referred to as the "old rates."
2
The rates in effect pursuant to section 901 of the Probate Code
effective on and after September 7, 1955, will be referred to as the
"new rates."

C.2d
commissions
July 19,
time of decedellt 's
and not the increased fees as allowed by section 901
of the Probate Code as amended and effective September 7,
determined by the
section 13988 of tbe Revenue and Taxation
reads in
follows:
''The
expenses of administration in the estate of
any decedent are deductible from the appraised value of
included in any transfer subject to this part made
by the decedent.
"Included in '
expenses of administration' are
the
"
comrmsswns allowed executors and
administrators under Section 901 of the Probate Code, computed on the value of the decedent's estate as of the date
of the decedent's death.
''
The ordinary fees allowed attorneys for executors
and administrators under Section 910 of the Probate Code,
computed on the value of the decedent's estate as of the
date of decedent's death.

,

If the statute specifically stated that ordinary expenses
of administration included executor's and administrator's
fees "under section 901 and 910 of the Probate Code in
effect as of the date of death'' there would be no question but
that the "old rates" should be used in computing the ordinary
expenses of administration.
The code section is not that explicit. It does, however,
restrict its operation to the date of death in that it allows
ordinary commissions '' ... computed on the value of decedent's
estate as of the date of decedent's death." (Italics added.)
In view of such language, the reasonable assumption is the
Legislature intended that in said computations those rate
schedules in effect as of the date of decedent's death were to
be used.
[2] Deductions allowable for inheritance tax purposes
are not necessarily those paid by the estate. [3] Under
section 13989 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, the federal
estate tax deduction is not necessarily the actual tax paid.
It is either that amount or a smaller amount based on the
approximate calculations. (Of. Estate of Slack, 86 Cal.App.
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2d 49 at 53
P.2d
125 CaL
App.2d 408 at 411 [1 et
This is also the situation with
section 13988 of
the Revenue and Taxation Code. The actual commission paid
in the probate
to section 901 of the
Probate Code is based ''upon the amount of estate accounted
for .... ' Section 13988 of the Revenue and Taxation Code
allows as a deduction said commissions ''
on the
value of the decedent's estate as of the date of decedent's
death.''
[4] Often the commissions allowed for inheritance tax
purposes are not the amount of the commissions actually
in the probate proceeding. The evident intent on the
part of the Legislature was not to allow as deductions the
actual burden sustained by an estate, but a close approximation
thereof, based on standards set up in the inheritance tax law.
[5] This is apparent from the provision in section 13988
of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which allows as a deduction
''ordinary expenses of administration.'' Extraordinary
expenses of administration although borne by the estate are not
a deduction for inheritance tax purposes.
[lb] The reasonable interpretation of section 13988 of
the Revenue and Taxation Code based upon the examination
of the statutory provisions is that there should be allowed as
deductions for inheritance tax purposes commissions based
upon the schedule of rates provided by section 901 of the
Probate Code at the time of decedent's death, that
in the
instant case, the so-called ''old rates.''
Such an interpretation is in keeping with the whole tenor
of the inheritance tax law, which keys everything to the date
of decedent's death. Section 13311 of the Revenue and Taxation Code defines "market value" as to any transfer as the
market value as of the date of decedent's death. Section
13402 assesses the tax upon that portion of the property
''in excess of the exemptions allowable on the date of the
transferor's death and at the rates which are then in effect."
Section 13408 provides that where there are several transfers,
the tax is computed as if all the property l1ad been transferred
a single transfer at the date of death. Section 13951 makes
the date of death the valuation date. Section 13983 allows
as deductions debts of the decedent at the date of death.
Section 13987 allows as deductions certain taxes which are
lien at the time of death. l;ikewisc, section 14102 makes
every tax due and payable at the elate of decedent's death.
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These
provisions indicate a clear
tent to restrict the deductions for executor's and
's
commissions to that
effect at the date of
decedent's death, that
ease, pursuant to the
''old rates.''
[6] The
of the "new rates" to the deductions
for inheritance taxes allowable under seetion 13988 of the
Hevenue and Taxation Code vvould be
as
constituting a gift of public monies, and such construction
should be avoided. [7] It is established that inheritance taxes
are fixed and determined m accordance with the law in
effect at the date of the
which in this case would be
the date of death.
[8] The Legislature cannot by a subsequent act increase
or decrease the rate, remit the tax, or in any way surrender,
impair or limit rights that have become fixed. (Estate of
Stanford, 126 Cal. 112, 118 et seq. [54 P. 259, 58 P. 462, 45
T_;.R.A. 788]; Estate of Rossi, 169 Cal. 148, 149 [146 P. 430].)
[9] ·where a tax has become due, a subsequent act of the
T_;egislature reducing the tax by reason of the change in the
exemptions, tax rates, or for that matter in any way, is held
to be a gift of state monies and is prohibited by article IV,
section 31, of the California Constitution. 3
Retroactive effect of such legislation is therefore prohibited.
(See Estate of Stanford, supra, where it is stated at page 121:
"We are, therefore, of the opinion that to give retroactive
effect to the law of 1897 would conflict with the provisions
of the constitution prohibiting the JJegislature from making
any gift or donation of any pnb1ie money or thing of value.
"\Ve quite agree with the appellant's counsel that 'an
heir or legatee must take his estate on such conditions as at
the time the state may have imposed'; and that subsequent
legislation could not affect such vested right. And this rule,
as already held, applies equally to the state, whose right to
the fund in question accrued undrr the act of 1893. ")
'rhe foregoing principles are applicable to the instant case.
On ,July 19, 1955, the date of decedent's death, the tax
"Article IV, section 31, of the California Constitution, ill imposing
restrictions upon the Legislature, declares: " . . . nor shnll it have
power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any
public money or thing of value to
individual, municipal or other
corporation whatever; provided,
nothing in this section shall
prevent the Legislature granting aid pursuant to Section :22 of this
article."

ESTATE OF SKINKER

297

[47 C.2d 290; 303 P.2d 745]

in accordance with the inheritance
law in effect
that time. Such law included section
1:3988 of the Hevenue and Taxation Code, and the rates for
('xecutor commissions applicable at that time \Yere the "old
rates." To read into section 13988 a change by virtue of
section 901
the Probate Code, as it became effective aptwo months thereafter, would be to read into the
statute construction which would result in the tax due at
the date of death being reduced. Such a construction would
eonstitute a
of state monies and should be avoided.
[10] It is an established principle of statutory construction that when two alternative interpretations are presented,
one of which would be unconstitutional and the other constitutional, the court will choose that construction which will
uphold the validity of the statute and will be constitutionaL
(County of Los Angeles v. Legg, 5 Cal.2d 349, 353 [2] [55
P.2d 206].) The proper interpretation of section 13988 requires the applieation in the instant case of the "old rates."
Estate of Spires, 126 Cal.App. 174 [14 P.2d 340], and
Estate of Parker, 200 Cal. 132 [251 P. 907], relied on by
appellants, are not applicable to the facts of the present case.
Each of the cited cases dealt with fees for extraordinary
services. [11] Extraordinary commissions and fees are different from statutory commissions. -whether any extra fees
or commissions should be allowed in a given case, and if so
and how much, is committed to the discretion of the court.
In the case of statutory commissions and fees, the determination is made by the J_,egislature. The court's function
is limited to a ministerial computation.
[12] It follows that statutory fees and commissions, such
as are involved in this case, are in the nature of fixed charges.
'rhe interest thus created, both from the standpoint of the
heirs, devisees, the personal representative and the attorney,
are substantive in character and not procedural. ( Cf. Estate
Potter, 188 Cal. 55, 60 [5] [204 P. 826].)
'rhe soundness of the above principles was reeognized by
this court in Estate of Parker, supra, ·where it is said at
pages 141-142: "The amendment in question, to the extent
that it removes aU limitation upon the amount which may
be allowed to executors and administrators as extra compensation for extraordinary services performed by them, has
the effect of imposing new and additional liabilities upon
estates in probate. A statute will not be given a retroactive
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construction
which it will
liabilities not
at the time of its passage. 'Laws which create new obligations, or
new
or exact new
because
of past transactions, have been universally reprobated by
civil and common law
and it is to be presumed that
no statute is intended to have such effect unless the ""T'+"''""
appears.'
The order is affirmed.

c.

and

concurred.
CARTER, ,J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion holds that the Legislature did not
intend by the 1955 amendment to section 901 of the Probate
Code (increasing the fees of administrators, which became
effective after decedent's death, but was in effect to fix the
executor's fees in the estate; see Estate of Johnston, ante,
p. 265 [303 P.2d 1]) to make such amendment applicable
in computing the inheritance tax on estates of persons who
died before its effective date; that such an application of the
amendment would be a gift of public money in violation of
the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 31) in that under the
prior law only the old allowances for executor's fees could
be deducted from the value of the estate in computing inheritance taxes.
There is no gift of public money contrary to the Constitution when we consider the applicable law. This court held in
Estate of Johnston, ante, pp. 265, 270, 271 [303 P.2d 1],
that the 1955 amendment to section 901 of the Probate Code
applied to persons who had died before its effective date but
where the administrator's fees had not yet been fixed. We
there said: "We are of the opinion that the commissions
of the executor and his attorney should be the amount of the
statutory commissions in effect at the time of the settlement
of the account and making of the order allowing compensation, to wit, in the instant case in accordance with the provisions of section 901 of the Probate Code as amended and
effective September 7, 1955 . . . . 'On the other hand [quoting
from Estate of Spi1·es, 126 CaL.App. 174, 177 (14 P.2d 340)],
the right of the executm· to a defined rate or standard of
compensation is not vested as of the date of the decedent's
death, nor even as of the date when he qualified as executor,
but S1lch right first accrues at the time when by appropriate

Nov. 1956]
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order the amount
compensation payable to him is determined and allowed. And since the right of an executor to
compensation for extraordinary services is not established or
vested until allowed by the court in the exercise of its discretion, it follows as a direct consequence that the law in force
at the time when the order is made constitutes the only law
by which the power of the court is to be governed.' (Italics
added.)
"The weight of authority in the United States is to the
effect that the law in force at the time of the settlement
of the account, and not at the date of death, governs the
amount of compensation allowed executors, administrators and
their attorneys.'' In addition the same has been said: ''The
matter of allowance of compensation to the personal representative . . . is generally made in and by the settlement
of the final account. But the representative is not entitled
to compensation until an allowance therefor has been made
by the court, even where compensation is provided for by the
will." (21 Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators,§ 892.)
And further with reference to time of valuation for computing
fees: ''Though the inventory value is prima facie evidence
of the value of the property, it is not conclusive. That is,
if the value as shown by the inventory is not satisfactory to
all parties concerned, it should be left open to inquiry. In
such event, a reappraisement and evidence of market value
may be given effect. It follows that where property is distributed in kind, or where the representative is charged with
the appraised value of property taken from the estate under
mortgage foreclosure and applied to payment of the debt
against the estate, the valuation in the inventory, in the
absence of objection or circumstances tending to induce suspicion that the appraised value is not fair and reasonable,
is the basis of estimating the representative's commissions."
(21 Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 888.) Therefore, nnder section 901 the administrator's fees were properly
computed on the basis of the law in effect at the time the
order therefor was made rather than at the date of death.
That was the law when the inheritance tax laws were adopted
and still is. That law provided that the rates or amount of
fees was determined as of such date rather than at the date of
death. We must look therefore at the inheritance tax law.
It provides that the "ordinary expenses of administration in
the estate . . . are deductible frorn the appraised value of
property"; included in such expenses are "The ordinary
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commissions allowed executors . . . under
of the
Probate
computed on th(~ value of the
estate as
of the date of . . death." (Emphasis
&
Tax. Code, §
That is to say, the fees deduetible for
the computation of the tax are those allowed
section .901.
Along with section 901 goes its construction when it is
amended as to the applicability of the amendment to estates
of persons
dead as above pointed out. Jn other words
the inheritance tax law im~orporates section 901 as
a deductible item in eomput.ing the tax and that section when
amended after a death still applies as seen from the foregoing
authorities. The inheritance tax law (Rev. & 'fax. Code,
snpra, § 13988) must be read as providing that administrator's
fees may be deducted to the extent authorized by section 901
as properly construed and applied ineluding the effect of
amendments. So reading, the etreet of section 901 on the
inheritanee tax law, it must follow that the law now is and
always has been that the decl1retible fees are those applicable
under section 901 at the time the fees are elaimed and allowed.
Hence there can be no gift of public money because the law
(inheritance tax law) has always authorized a deduction based
on the rate effective when the order for fees is made. As is
said in Estate of Slack, 86 Oal.App.2d 49, 54 [194 P.2d 61] :
'' [lt is] the intent of the I_jegislature that the deductions
[from the value of the estate in inheritance tax computations l
to be allowed are only those which have been paid or in which
the liability has been attached so that they are actually due.''
The majority opinion holds that because the fee deduction
for inheritanee tax purposes ( § 901) must be on the value
of the estate at the time of death, the rates must be those
effective at that time. That does not follow because the fees
are not computed on the valne of the estate at death. They
are computed upon the amount of the estate accounted for.
The key words are "on" and "value." It has nothing to do
with the amount of the deduction allowed, that is, from the
standpoint of rates to be applied. It has only to do with the
base to which the rates-percentages are to be applied. It is
to be computed "on" the value at death which means nothing
more than a mathematical computation using the value at that
time. It says nothing about the rates to be applied in determining the fees, that is, those existing after death when the
estate is accounted for and the fees are based upon the
amount so accounted for.
It necessarily follows that the asrertainment of the arnount
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of the taxes cannot be determined until the expenses of administration are known sometime during the estate proceedings
<;Ven though the taxes are due on death under the inheritance
tax law.* The determination of that amount depends on the
deductions allowed and that in turn depends on the law in
effect when the deductions are allowed. Allen v. Franchise
l'ax Board, 39 Cal.2d 109
P.2d
, is analogous. There
it was held that an amendment to the income tax law which
authorized the apportionment of a lump sum income over the
years in which it was earned instead of allocating it all to one
year, >vas applicable to ineome thus earned in prior years; that
there '>Vas no gift of public money. It is there said (at p.
114): "It cannot be <1enied that the result is to reach
all of the income received by the affected taxpayers and, as in
the case of other taxpayers, at the rates applicable in the
years in which it was earned. No income is freed from tax
liability. Taxpayers in the situation of the plaintiff are in
effect merely given the same opportunity as all other taxpayers to return their income for taxation in the year in
which it was earned. 'l'he Legislature has said that the tax
produced at the rate so applicable is all that the state is
entitled to and that the taxpayers affected by the change
should be treated as are taxpayers who return compensation
in the year in whieh it was earned. . . .
''There can be no constitutional objection to the result which
affects only the tax base as distinguished from a tax rate
change where, as in this case, the provision was enacted prior
to the time the tax should become due and payable. The
provision was enacted and became effective prior to the time
when the state's right to receive or collect the tax accrued.
'l'here is therefore no relinquishment of a vested state right."
Similarly in the instant ease only the tax base, not the rate,
is changed by the 1955 amendment of section 901. The amount
of the tax is not known and it is not collectible until the
expenses of administration are known including the authorized
deductions such as administrator's fees.
The inheritance tax law must be examined realistically. Its
basic theory is '' ' . . . that the inheritance tax is imposed
upon the net clear value of what the transferee receives, and
that to ascertain this the value of what he does not receive,
in contemplation of law, must be deducted from the value
*'fhey are not delinquent until two years after they become due
and payable. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 14103.)
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Knapp, 37 Ca1.2d
of what the decedent left.' ''
827, 831 [236 P.2d 372]
And: "While the tax imposed by
the act is not a tax on property as such, but a tax upon one for
the privilege of succeeding to property, the amount of the
tax as to any beneficiary is to be determined according to the
the value
such
value of the 'net succession,'--that
property as remains
him afler the satisfaction of s1wh
charyes and burdens as may lawfully be satisfied in due
course of aclrninistt·ation. It is only such property that can
be properly said to actually pass to the beneficiary.'' (Emphasis added; Estate of IIite, 159 Cal. 392, 394 [113 P. 1072,
Ann.Cas. 1912C 1014, 32 L.R.A.N.S. 1165] ; see also Estate of
Miller, 184 Cal. 674 [195 P. 413, 16 A.I-l.R. 694] .) This fundamental basis will be thwarted if, as held by the majority,
the estate must pay the increased executor's fees (Estate of
Johnston, supra, ante, p. 265) but the beneficiary must
pay taxes on that which he does not receive. Indeed, there
is no recipient of the claimed gift of public money as the
beneficiary does not get the extra compensation because it is
paid to the executor who, under the law as properly interpreted, is entitled to it (Estate of Johnston, supr·a) ; it is not
a gift to him.
Such cases as Estate of ~Martin, 153 CaL 225 [94 P. 1053],
Estate of Stanford, 126 Cal. 112 [54 P. 259, 58 P. 462, 45
hR.A. 788], Trippet v. State, 149 Cal. 521 [86 P. 1084, 8
L.R.A.N.S. 1210], and Estate of Potter, 188 Cal. 55 [204
P. 826], are not controlling for they involved an attempt to
relieve an estate from a tax after death. Here, as seen, the
only question is the method of arriving at the tax or the basis
for the computation of the tax. Since this court has held
that the fees allowable to executors, administrators and their
attorneys must be determined according to the law in effect
at the date of the allowance of such fees, and the inheritance
tax law makes sueh fees deductible items in computing the
tax, it must follow that any such fees so allowed are deductible
items in eomputing inheritance taxes. The application of
this rule may have the effect of increasing the amount of the
inheritance tax as well as reducing it. For example, an estate
consisting largely of securities which enjoyed a high price
listing at time of death, but suffered severe deflation in price
due to eeonomic depression during the administration of the
estate, so that the amount accounted for is far less than the
value at the time of death, the fees allowable might be considerably less even though the rate may have been increased

Nov.

EsTATE OF FRANKLIN

303

[47 C.2d 303; 303 P.2d 339]

since the date of death. In such a case the value for inheritance tax purposes would be the higher value at the date of
death while the fees would be computed on the lesser amount
aceounted for. In other words, the basis for computing the
fees is not the same as the one used for computing the
hence the applicable law need not be the same.
I would therefore reverse the order.

A. No. 24148.

In Bank.

Nov. 20, 1956.]

Estate of EDWAHD J. J;'R~-\NKLIN, Deceased. ROBERT
0. PFLl<JGEH, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA
NATIONAI-1 'l'RUS'r AND SAVINGS ASSOCL,\TION,
Respondent.
Estates-Executors-Compensation: AttorneysCompensation.-The rate of compensation allowed to executors,
administrators and their attorneys should be determined by
the law in effect at the date of the order allowing compensation,
not that in effect at the date of death of decedent.

[1] Decedents'

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County settling the final account and decree of distribution under a will. Alfred E. Paonessa, Judge. Reversed.
Robert 0. Pfleger, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
THE COURT.-The question here involved is whether the
compensation allowed to executors, administrators and their
attorneys should be governed by (1) the law in effect at the
time of the settlement of the account and making the order
allowing compensation, or (2) the law effective at the date
of death of decedent.
[1] vVc are of the opinion that the proper rule is that
the rate of compensation should be determined by the law in
effect at the date of the order allowing compensation. (See
Estate of Johnston, ante, p. 265 [303 P.2d 1] .)
Since the probate court in the instant case did not apply
this rule, the order appealed from is reversed.
[1] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Exncutors and Administrators, § 880, 899.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Decedents' Estates, §§ 211, 849.

